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This paper explores whether MT and IT apply to public artworks. In 
particular, it discusses whether a public artwork can acquire through 
time a property that cannot possibly accord with the artist's intentions, 
and consequently, whether an interpretation that attributes that "new " 
property to that public artwork can be legitimate. It also clarifies when 
an artwork is public and introduces the exam ple of a public artwork 
that seem s to have acquired a property at odds with the artist's inten­
tions. It discusses and argues that Carroll's intentionalist account of 
conversation is insufficient. Conversations, like public artworks, possess 
perlocutionary features that, at least sometimes, cannot be explained on 
intentionalist grounds.
1. Introduction
Noel Carroll’s modest actual intentionalism (MAI) argues for (at least) the two 
following theses about the artist’s intentions (Carroll, 1992: 97-131) Call the first 
one metaphysical thesis (MT): the artist’s intentions are relevant to fixing the 
artistically salient properties that an artwork has, that is, its identity (Carroll, 
1995: 257.). Call the second one interpretational thesis (IT): the artist’s intentions 
are relevant to constraining an artwork’s possible interpretation(s) (Carroll, 
1997: 305).
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As a consequence of MT, an artwork cannot acquire through time an artisti- 
cally salient property that exceeds the expected possibilities that an artist could 
have intended (e.g., an “anachronistic” stylistic property). In effect, Carroll says, 
to admit a change in an artwork’s properties would entail to accept the possibil- 
ity of backward causation -  a “commitment” that seems “problematic in and of 
itself” (Carroll, 1995: 256).
And as a consequence of IT, one cannot consider as legitimate those inter- 
pretations imputing “newly acquired” properties that cannot be possibly recon- 
ciled with the artist’s intentions. In Carroll’s view, those are, at best, metaphori- 
cal and heuristic discourses that are psychologically valuable, and that do not 
play any “probative” function in determining the “real properties of artworks” 
(Carroll, 1995: 257).
This paper explores whether MT and IT apply to public artworks. In particu- 
lar, it discusses whether a public artwork can acquire through time a property 
that cannot possibly accord with the artist’s intentions, and consequently, 
whether an interpretation that attributes that “new” property to that public art­
work can be legitimate. Contra MAI, I argue that, as a consequence of a change 
in its context of reception, a public artwork can acquire a property that the artist 
could not have foreseen. I also suggest that interpretations at odds with the art- 
ist’s intentions can be legitimate. Therefore, I hold that MT and IT do not apply 
to public artworks.
I develop my argument by discussing Carroll’s original defense of MAI. 
There, Carroll develops an argument from analogy that I call “conversational 
hypothesis” (CH). CH argues that, when engaging an artwork, we enter a rela- 
tionship with the artist that is “roughly analogous” to having a conversation with 
her (Carroll, 1992: 117). I accept CH as instructive.Ł However, by drawing on 
recent developments in linguistic anthropology and conversational analysis, 
I argue that the intentionalist account of conversation falls short when consider- 
ing perlocutionary acts and their effects. Analogically, intentionalism does not 
have the resources to explain what I call a public artwork’s perlocutionary prop- 
erties.
Before continuing, let me make explicit why I focus on public art. First, 
I choose public art since I believe that no artistic practice is actively shaping our
1 Some philosophers challenge intentionalism on the basis, among other things, of the inadequacy 
of the conversational model. See: Davies, 2006: 223-247; Dickie, 2006: 70-81; Margolis, 2010; Wilson, 
1997: 309-311.
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world as that art form is doing. For instance, a decision in public art matters can 
result in an action that could change forever the plaza where one lives, or the 
street where one has her office. Second, as a public phenomenon, public art is at 
odds with dominant aesthetic theories, which sees art as “the product of an indi- 
vidual and autonomous act of expression, and its appreciation [as], likewise, 
a private act of contemplation” (Hein, 1996: 1). As such, it help us consider new 
possibilities in terms of aesthetics inquiries.
Section 2 clarifies when an artwork is public and introduces the example of 
a public artwork that seems to have acquired a property at odds with the artist’s 
intentions. Section 3 discusses CH, and argues that Carroll’s intentionalist ac- 
count of conversation is insufficient. Conversations, like public artworks, possess 
perlocutionary features that, at least sometimes, cannot be explained on inten- 
tionalist grounds. Section 4 discusses a possible objection to my account.
2. Removing a Public Artwork: 
Silva’s Rock Steady Gravity Sketch
Realized by Brazilian artist Artur Silva, Rock Steady Gravity Sketch is a sculpture 
that was installed outside The Avenue apartments building, near 10th Street and 
Indiana Avenue in Indianapolis, IN.2 It was inaugurated on Friday, August 24, 
2012. Sized 6' 7" x 6' 2", the sculpture is in aluminum and vinyl on steel with 
internal LED lights. It represents in full-scale an African American “b-boy” -  
that is, a male breakdancer -  wearing blue pants and a bright yellow long sleeve 
shirt. The b-boy is represented in the act of performing a particular dance move 
called “handstand.” When performing the handstand, a dancer stands on his 
hands with his feet in the air. With his piece, Silva intended to celebrate publicly 
African-American culture. In particular, Silva’s desire was to connect two fun- 
damental achievements in African-American history, that is, the Jazz Age and 
the hip-hop “revolution.” Such a connection was made possible by the nature of 
the location where the piece was installed. During the Jazz Age (1920s), the area 
around Indiana Avenue was a center of African American night life (Taflinger, 
2012).
2 See <http://artursilva.com/section/318204_Rock_Steady_Gravity_Sketch.html>.
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Silva’s Rock Steady is a public artwork. By following a dominant strand in the 
studies of public art, one can characterize public artworks (whose extension in- 
cludes, though not exclusively, things like monuments, memorials, public sculp- 
tures, and so on) in terms of their context of reception.3 In effect, when we con- 
sider non-public artworks, their reception takes place within a specific context, 
the artworld, whose features are generally determined by art historical consid- 
erations. On the contrary, public artworks are received primarily within a more 
general and unspecialized context. Public artworks are in fact received within 
a “public sphere.”4 Public art scholarship borrows the notion of a public sphere 
from the work of German philosopher Jurgen Habermas.5 By drawing on 
Habermas’ view, we can characterize a public sphere as the discursive space con- 
stituted by private individuals debating rationally (or perhaps reasonably) issues 
related to the public good.6
By drawing on Michael Warner’s work on public and counter-publics, Jenni- 
fer Mikulay suggests that public art addresses and constitutes multiple publics 
rather than a single and overarching unity (see Warner, 2002: 49-90). The pub­
lics of public art, Mikulay writes, are “best not reduced to ‘the public,’ ‘the com- 
munity,’ or ‘the audience.’” (Mikulay, 2011: 5-23). In this sense, one could also 
add that public artworks are not received within a public sphere, but within dif­
ferent public spheres.7 Those public spheres are the multiple discursive spaces 
where different publics debate issues related to the presentation of distinct public 
artworks.
As Arthur Danto and Harriet Senie independently argue, when discussing 
artworks in a public sphere, aesthetic concerns are irrelevant (Danto, 1998: 147­
151; Senie, 1992: 173). Political, social, and economic issues related to the public 
good are the focus of those discussions. In fact, discussions about public art­
works build up around questions such as “How does the public artwork relate to 
the identity of its site and relative communities?”, “Does it suit the identity of
3 See, for instance, Knight, Senie, 2012: 1-2.
4 See, for instance, Mitchell, 1992a: 1-5; Mitchell, 1992b: 29-48; Senie, 2002: 102-103; Knight, 2008; 
Zuidervaart, 2011).
5 See Habermas, 1989. The original version, published in German, is an adaptation from Habermas’ 
Habilitationsschrifts at the University of Marburg. See Habermas, 1962.
6 As many theorists suggest, Habermas’ conception of rationality is too narrow for capturing the 
logic of public discourse. In particular, it seems incapable of understanding the role emotions. See, 
among others, Gardiner, 2004: 28-48.
7 See, for instance, Rospocher, 2012: 9-28; Eager et al (eds.), 2001; Eager, 2001; Landes, 1988.
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those communities?”, “Was the monetary budget appropriate?”, “Was the budget 
well administered?”, “Does the public artwork have a negative environmental 
impact?”, and other questions directly related to a relevant issue explicitly ad- 
dressed by the content of the artwork.8 One should emphasize that those ques- 
tions address actual issues that interest the members of a public artwork’s public, 
and answers to those questions are meant to have practical consequences.
By appreciating the preceding, one should emphasize that art historical con- 
siderations do not have priority in determining the features of a public artwork’s 
context of reception. In effect, because of the intimate relationship that connects 
a public artwork to its public(s), the features of a public artwork’s context of 
reception (a public sphere) are much more likely to be determined by the his- 
tory(-ies) of those who participate in its discussions, that is, the members of its 
public(s). In this sense, the features of a public artwork’s context of reception are 
not generally determined by art historical considerations, but rather (though not 
exclusively) by considerations of the history of that artwork’s public(s).
With these notions in mind, let me go back to Rock Steady.9 Unfortunately, a few 
days after the installation of Rock Steady, on September 3, a tragic event occurred. 
A Purdue University freshman, Xavier Somerville, fell from a fifth-floor balcony 
trying to evade police during a rowdy party, and died in the proximity of Silva’s 
statue. In the aftermath of this event, some have started recognizing a close resem- 
blance between the dancer represented in Rock Steady and a young man falling. 
Because of this possible resemblance, some started to question whether it was ap- 
propriate to keep the statue in its original location. Some believed that it was not 
appropriate, and asked for the relocation of Silva’s work.10
8 Questions of monetary budget were at the core of the debates generated respectively by Noguchi’s 
Landscape o f  Time (1977) and Michael Heizer’s Adjacent, Against, Upon (1977). Questions of identita- 
rian appropriateness were fundamental in the debates generated by Pablo Picasso’s Untitled (1967), also 
referred to as “Chicago Picasso,” and Robert Graham’s M onument to Joe Louis (1986). Questions of 
environmental sustainability are, among others, the critical focus of the still on-going debate generated 
by Pino Castagna’s In pietra alpestra e dura (2009). Questions about the issues related to the Vietnam 
War and its consequences on veterans were and still are the very focus of the reception of Maya Lin’s 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall (1982). Other socially relevant issues that have been addressed expli- 
citly by public artworks include women’s and minorities’ rights, HIV/AIDS research and care, and 
environmental awareness.
9 See AA.VV. “Storm Over Statue Highlights Angst Over Indy Art,” (October 6, 2012) <http:// 
www.courierpress.com/news/2012/oct/06/storm-over-statue-highlights-angst-over-indy-art/>.
10 In a private conversation, Arthur Silva suggested me that journalists from FOX news were in- 
strumental in creating the controversy.
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Others opposed that proposal by pointing to the fact that all the evidence we 
have indicated that Arthur Silva did not have the intention to make his statue as 
resembling a young man falling. Those opposing relocation believed that the 
interpretation invoked by those asking for removal was incorrect, and argued 
that one should not remove the artwork on the basis of such a mistaken reading. 
When asked about his opinion on the proposal of removing the statue, Bryan 
Cahen, a retired art administrator living in Indianapolis, replied quite colorfully 
that its resembling a young man falling was an “idiotic reason to remove a piece 
of artwork [sic].”11
After a few weeks of harsh controversy, the proposal to relocate the statue 
prevailed, and Rock Steady has been removed from its original location since 
then. But were those opposing Rock Steady’s relocation correct? Was the inter­
pretation attributing “resembling a young man falling” to Silva’s statue unwar- 
ranted? Was that resemblance a mere psychological association, or did it belong 
to the real properties of Rock Steady’s properties? And more generally, do artistic 
intentions constrain the identity and interpretation of public artworks?
In the following section, I consider the previous questions. I suggest that “re­
sembling a young man falling” should be considered as a perlocutionary prop- 
erty of Rock Steady. Perlocutionary properties are among the real properties of 
an artwork, and partly determine its meaning. Artworks’ perlocutionary proper- 
ties are analogous to the perlocutionary acts that one performs in a conversation. 
Since one cannot fully explain conversations’ perlocutionary acts in terms of the 
speaker’s intentions, I argue that the same holds for artworks’ perlocutionary 
properties. In this sense, there are plausible grounds for considering “resembling 
a young man falling” as among Rock Steady’s properties, and the interpretation 
attributing that property to the statue as legitimate. As a further consequence, 
I also contend that the proposal to relocate Rock Steady was not unreasonable. 
More in general, I suggest that MT and IT do not (strictly) apply when consider­
ing public artworks.
Before continuing I want to emphasize that I remain neutral about whether 
removing Silva’s statue was the optimal choice. This paper does not pick a side in 
the controversy. Its aim is to unpack those philosophical complications that 
emerge when considering Rock Steady’s controversial case.12
11 “Storm Over Statue Highlights Angst Over Indy Art.”
12 At the IAS meeting in Krakow, where an earlier version of this paper was presented, some partic- 
ipants suggested -  I believe correctly -  that my model would support an argument against Rock Steady’s
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3. Intentions, Conversations, and Perlocutions
In How to Do Things with Words, Austin argues that a fundamental aspect of the 
“meaning” of an expression is what it is used to do, that is, what kind of act(ion) 
one performs when one says something (Austin, 1962). What kind of act(ion) 
one performs when one says something is the speech act aspect of language. Aus­
tin distinguishes between three kinds (or levels) of speech acts: locutionary acts, 
illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts. First, a locutionary act is the per­
formance of a basic linguistic action of uttering sounds that have meaning or 
definite reference.13 Second, an illocutionary act is the act of determining “in 
what way we are using” a locutionary act (Austin, 1962: 98). In other words, the 
illocutionary act specifies the act that one is performing in saying something 
such as asking or answering a question, giving an assurance or a warning, mak- 
ing an appeal or a criticism. (Those are only a few examples of this kind of 
speech acts.) (Austin, 1962: 102). Third, a perlocutionary act is the act of bring- 
ing about specific effects on the feelings, thoughts, or behavior of the hearers, for 
example, persuading or convincing someone to do something. Call perlocution­
ary effect as the effect of generating particular consequences on the feelings, atti- 
tudes, and subsequent behavior of the hearers such as “being convinced that,” 
“being persuaded that,” „being surprised that,” or “being mislead that.”
Carroll believes that illocutionary acts consist characteristically in uttering 
words in sentences with certain intentions, and illocutionary effects are always 
produced as a consequence of particular (intentional) illocutionary acts. In this 
sense, he argues that the meaning of an illocutionary act depends on and can be 
interpreted by means of the speaker’s intention. In a conversation, Carroll writes, 
“the meaning of an utterance is explicated in terms of the speaker’s intention to 
reveal to an auditor that the speaker intends the auditor to respond in a certain 
way.” (Carroll, 1992: 97).
Many would agree that Carroll (and intentionalists in general) is correct 
about illocutionary acts.14 However, normal (and perhaps one could say mean-
removal. By resembling a young man falling, Silva’s statue could be thought as a way to honor Some- 
rville’s memory.
13 Austin further distinguishes between three kinds of locutionary acts: phonetic acts, which are 
mere emissions of noises; phatic acts, which are utterances of grammatical sentences; and rhetic acts, 
which utterances of a sentence with a definite sense and reference. Austin writes that the “pheme is 
a unit of language [but] the rheme is a unit of speech” (Austin, 1962: 98).
14 Carroll’s account comes directly from Grice’s account of meaning, which is widely accepted in 
philosophy of language. See Grice, 1957: 377-388; Grice, 1968: 225-242. However, Duranti challenges 
the view that a distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects can be applied to utterances 
in real-life conversations. He suggests that, in many cases, whether an utterance p  is an illocutionary act
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ingful) conversations include also perlocutionary acts and effects. (I start a con- 
versation with you because I want to convince you not to ask for a divorce.) But, 
as Alessandro Duranti suggests, intentionalism’s shortcomings clearly appear 
when trying to explain the perlocutionary dimension that normally characterizes 
conversations (Duranti, 1993: 14).
For instance, I can promise you that p  by merely saying “I am promising you 
that p ," and, plausibly, the meaning of my utterance is determined by my inten- 
tion to promise you that p. But I cannot convince you that p  by merely telling 
you: “I am convincing you that p .” (After our conversation, you could still want 
a divorce.) Whether my attempt to convince you that p  is successful depends on 
how you respond to my words, not on my intention to do so. And, plausibly, by 
trying to convince you that p, my words may very well have the unintentional 
effect of convincing you that non-p. (Perhaps, my words convinced you even 
more that you want a divorce!)
Then, if not in terms of the speaker’s intention, how should we explain the 
perlocutionary dimension of a conversation, with particular reference to its per- 
locutionary effects? By drawing on linguistic anthropology,15 interactionist ap- 
proaches to the study of language,16 and empirical researches in the social sci- 
ences (Bourdieu, 1977; Kochman, 1983: 329-337; Schegloff, Sacks, 1973: 289­
327; Streek, 1980: 133-154). I propose an answer that echoes “hermeneutic” 
approaches to interpretation such as one can find in thinkers like Bakhtin, 
Gadamer, and Wittgenstein (Bakhtin, 1981; Gadamer, 1976; Wittgenstein, 1953). 
Rather than in terms of the speaker’s intention, one could better explain perlocu­
tionary effects in terms of socially available criteria, which one might also call as 
“grammatical rules” or “local norms” (Duranti, 2009: 14).
One cannot determine a priori which criteria apply in interpreting the perlo- 
cutionary aspects of real-life conversation (Duranti, 1986: 241). Criteria are im- 
plicitly negotiated by those conversing while conversing. Conversations are, 
I believe, similar to those games where we “make up the rules as we go along.”17
of a particular type is partly determined by how the audience reacts. However, here I do not discuss this 
possibility. See, for instance, Duranti, 1993: 26.
15 For a introduction to Linguistic Anthropology, see Duranti, 2005. For a useful overview of the 
field and its debates, see Duranti, 2009. See also Duranti, 1986: 239-247.
16 See, among others, Goodwin, 1981.
17 At § 83 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes: “And is there not also the case 
where we play and -  make up the rules as we go along? And there is one where we alter them -  as we go 
along.”
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Such a selection is significantly influenced by “the dynamics between the 
speaker’s words and the ensuing circumstances (audience’s response included)” 
(Duranti, 1986: 241). As Duranti puts it:
interpretations [of perlocutionary effects are] defined by the kind o f  norms and social world 
that the participants in the interaction are able to evoke at a given time and place. Furthermore, 
there are many cases in daily life in which the meaning of a given act is not defined until the 
recipient of that act has replied.18
In order to clarify this point, I should add few remarks. I am arguing that 
perlocutionary effects of conversations and their interpretations cannot be ex- 
plained solely in terms of the speaker’s intention. They are primarily explained 
in terms of contextual considerations about the larger socio-historical setting 
within which the conversation is taking place, the relations between the speaker 
and the audience, and the psychological dispositions of the interlocutors.19 Those 
considerations concur significantly to determine what kind of perlocutionary 
effects an utterance brings about.
In this sense, one should not rule out the possibility that uttering in different 
contexts -  where different “local” norms are at play -  the very same words with 
the same intention (that is, the same locutionary and illocutionary acts) may very 
well generate very different perlocutionary effects. Thus, one cannot fully deter- 
mine the “meaning” of utterances in a conversation, in particular with respect to 
their perlocutionary effects, in terms of a speaker’s intention. As a consequence, 
when considering conversations, their interpretation cannot be constrained by 
the speaker’s intention.
I should also emphasize the following crucial point. The context of a conver- 
sation is not a “static container” for utterances. It is dynamic and receptive, and 
cannot be determined and known by interlocutors before the conversation starts, 
neither under idealized conditions. Moreover, context is continually produced
18 Ivi. Emphasis added.
19 Here, I want to emphasize a point. I have a sense that both Gadamer’s and Wittgenstein’s theory 
of interpretation generally focus on “intersubjective” (e.g., socio-historical and interactional) aspects, 
while often overlooking the importance of psychological dispositions as important contextual elements.
I find Bakhtin’s view more accurate in this regard. He writes: “In the actual life of speech, every concrete 
act of understanding ... assimilates the word to be understood into its own conceptual system filled with 
specific objects and emotional expressions... [P]rimacy belongs to the response as the activating principle: 
it creates the ground for understanding.” (Bakhtin, 1981: 282. Emphasis in the original).
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through the same conversational interactions.20 It is influenced by what is ut- 
tered when uttered, and conversational interactions continually redefine it.21
Consider the following example. My friend Gino used to tell a (supposedly) 
true story of a poorly performed “party trick” at a wedding ceremony. According 
to the story, a wedding guest opens a bottle of champagne with a saber. The 
guest does not control the just broken neck of the bottle, which flies across the 
room and hits the bride in her left eye. The story, and the way Gino was able to 
tell it, used to generate humorous laughs among those who heard it. (I must ad- 
mit that I found it somewhat cruel, but nonetheless funny.) With the same inten­
tion of generating laugh, Gino told the story one more time. However, he told 
the story to a man whose bride underwent a similar accident. Of course, this 
man reacted with visible distress rather than with laughter.
One could interpret that conversation as follows. The context within which 
the interaction between Gino and this man took place changed, in a way that 
cannot be explained in terms of Gino’s intention, some properties of his utter­
ances. In particular, it changed the nature of some of its perlocutionary acts, 
which became acts of mocking, disrespecting, and insulting rather than of ban- 
tering. Those perlocutionary acts had the (unintended) perlocutionary effect of 
distress in Gino’s interlocutor. (That night, Gino felt as embarrassed as one 
could imagine, and apologized sincerely to the man and his wife. He never told 
that story again.)22
By appreciating the preceding, I argue that public artworks are analogous to 
conversations, but to conversations that include perlocutionary acts -  as virtually 
every real-life conversation does. In this sense, like utterances, public artworks 
possess (sometimes intentionally) what some philosophers call “perlocutionary
20 This thesis is also at the core of Paul Dourish’s work on information theory in Where the Action 
Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
21 See Duranti, 2012: 12-23. Context has been re-examined along these lines in Duranti, Goodwin, 
1992.
22 One cannot dismiss this example by suggesting that this is a case of “failed communication,” and 
that in cases of successful communication perlocutionary effects comply with those intended. In effect, if 
one would be willing to define all those cases where unintended perlocutionary effects obtain as cases of 
failed communication, one should also maintain that most cases (perhaps virtually all cases) of human 
communication are cases of failed communication. It seems to me obvious that, most of the times, our 
words generate unintended reactions. For instance, since in virtually every philosophical conversation 
not all the participants are convinced by the same claims, then philosophical conversations would be 
examples of failed communication. I take this consequence as a reductio ad absurdum  of this objection.
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properties,” that is, “potentials for performing acts and achieving effects”.23 In 
suggesting that public artworks have perlocutionary properties, I am drawing on 
works by David Goldblatt and Arthur Danto. Goldblatt argues that what I define 
as an artwork’s perlocutionary properties are sometimes “integral to the meaning 
of the work” (Goldblatt, 2011.) ‘ On his part, Danto writes that public artworks 
are perlocutionary since they “do more than convey information” (Danto, 1998: 
149).
As I have argued in the case of perlocutionary effects, the perlocutionary 
properties that a public artwork has cannot be explained in terms of the artist’s 
intention. In effect, perlocutionary properties and, a fortiori, a public artwork’s 
identity are determined significantly by considerations of the context within 
which the metaphorical conversation between an artist and members of its pub- 
lic(s) obtains. The features of that context of conversation are determined by 
a number of factors, including the interaction among members of the artwork’s 
public(s), their collective history(-ies), and so on. Changes in those factors may 
very well modify the perlocutionary aspects of an artist’s “utterance,” that is, of 
her artwork. Thus, if a public artwork can have properties that do not comply 
with the artist’s intention, then a public artwork’s interpretation cannot be con- 
strained by that intention. In this sense, MT and IT as developed by MAI do not 
apply in the case of public artworks.
Let us reconsider by means of the conceptual resources developed in this sec­
tion Rock Steady’s case. One could assume that the original context within which 
the metaphorical conversation between Silva and members of Rock Steady’s pub- 
lic(s) evoked a social world and local norms such that the perlocutionary acts 
and effects that the sculpture engendered matched those intended by the author. 
However, a relevant change in that context, that is, Somerville’s tragic death, 
modified the social world and the norms that the conversation between Silva and 
the members of Rock Steady’s public(s) could evoke. As a consequence of that 
change, Silva’s “utterance,” that is, Rock Steady, acquired the perlocutionary 
property of “bringing to mind the forms of someone’s falling.” According to the 
local norms that the context evoked, some found the likeness suggested by the 
image as inappropriate and, as a perlocutionary effect, experienced a feeling of 
discomfort.
23 M. Richard, When Truth Gives Out (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2008, 12). David Davies uses the term “perlocutionary property” when discussing artworks. See Davies, 
2004: 91.
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I should emphasize that the above discussion of how Rock Steady acquired 
the new property “resembling a young man falling” follows analogically the 
rather un-controversial idea that the same words uttered in different contexts 
may very well mean different things, and may very well generate justified diverg- 
ing reactions in those participating in the conversation. Of course, intentionalists 
might object that one should “freeze” the context within which the conversation 
between an artist and members of its public(s) takes place, while maintaining 
that only contextual considerations relative to the moment when the artwork 
was firstly presented are acceptable. One could answer intentionalists that what 
they are describing, then, is not a conversation. In this sense, they cannot defend 
their views in terms of a conversationalist model. The burden of the proof is 
theirs.
4. An Objection Considered: Meaning and Significance
At this point, Carroll could defend his view by claiming that my argument about 
perlocutionary properties is not a threat to intentionalism. In effect, he could 
suggest that my argument is concerned with what one might call Rock Steady’s 
significance, and not with its meaning. Hirsch first introduced such a distinc- 
tion.24 According to that distinction, meaning is “what the author meant by his 
use of a particular sign sequence, it is what the sign represents” (Hirsch, 1966: 8). 
By being determined by the artist’s intention, meaning is fixed and immutable. 
Significance, on the contrary depends on the present use of the artwork, and is 
therefore changeable. In effect, significance “names a relationship between that 
meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed anything imag- 
inable” (Hirsch, 1966: 8). Whereas meaning is the “exclusive object” of interpre­
tation, significance “is the proper object of criticism” (Hirsch, 1966: 57).
In “Artworks and the Future,” Jerrold Levinson uses Hirsch’s distinction be­
tween meaning and significance in order to deny that the real properties of an 
artwork can change over time (Levinson, 2011: 210 and ff). Meaning, Levinson 
argues, has to do with what he calls the “content” of an artwork, which includes 
its “aesthetics p ro p erties., artistic p ro p erties., representational properties, and
24 See Hirsch, 1960: 463-479; Hirsch, 1966; Hirsch, 1984: 202-225. The distinction appears exten- 
sively in the intentionalist literature. See, among others, Carrol, 1995; Levinson, 2011: 179-214; and, 
Stecker, 1994: 193-206.
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meaning properties.” (Levinson, 2011: 182). Significance captures instead all 
those relational features that are „outside the sphere of proper understanding of 
[an] artwork” (Levinson, 2011: 190). In other words, according to Levinson, 
when we speak about an artwork’s significance, we refer to those “salient simi- 
larities, echoes, or parallelism discernible between the given work and the exter- 
nal matter with which it is brought into comparative relation” (Levinson, 2011: 
190). And yet, those relations do not posses a constitutive function, and do not 
modify the content of the artwork, that is, its meaning.
Carroll could then say that “resembling a young man falling” is part of Rock 
Steady’s significance, but not of its meaning. Accordingly, his view could ac- 
commodate the perceived resemblance between Silva’s statue and a young man 
falling while denying that “resembling a young man falling” is a real property of 
Rock Steady. In this sense, Carroll could allow the critical discourse that sees the 
sculpture as echoing the death of Somerville without undermining MT or IT. In 
brief, on the light of this distinction, Carroll could conclude, MAI seems to apply 
to public art as well.
There are at least two ways to meet the potential challenge discussed in 
above. The first response is to bite the bullet and accept that “resembling a young 
man falling” is part of Rock Steady’s significance, and to further press the point 
by asking what are the practical consequences of introducing such a distinction 
at the level of public discourse. By considering such a resemblance as part of 
Rock Steady’s significance, would a person be justified in asking for the removal 
of the statue? Would that request be reasonable once we consider “resembling 
a young man falling” as an aspect of that sculpture’s significance? Hirsch’s dis- 
cussion of meaning and significance, I believe, offers a suitable starting point for 
answering these questions.
When introducing the analytic distinction between meaning and signifi­
cance, Hirsch’s intent was not to dismiss the relevance of the latter. According to 
Hirsch, in effect, significance as the object of criticism is more “valuable and 
useful” than meaning (Hirsch, 1966: 190). “[Significance,” he writes, “changeable 
or not, is the more valuable object of interpretation, because it typically embraces 
the present use of texts, and present use is present value” (Hirsch, 1984, 203). 
Therefore, if one accepts Hirsch’s point about significance’s greater value, then 
one seems also committed to accept as most valuable the critical assessment ac- 
cording to which Rock Steady evokes the forms of a young man falling. In other 
words, to say that “resembling a young man falling” belongs to the sculpture’s
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significance does not imply the dismissal of those readings that refer to that re­
semblance. Quite the contrary, it seems to suggest that such a reading is more 
valuable than an interpretation that depends on the sculpture’s meaning, or, at 
least, that they are both acceptable. In this sense, by considering “resembling 
a young man falling” as an aspect of Rock Steady’s significance, one seems com- 
mitted to accept as reasonable the request to remove the statue. If my analysis is 
correct, then, Carroll and I might have reached some sort of agreement. Though 
still differing in principle, pragmatically both views allow for that open debate 
that essentially characterizes the appreciation of Rock Steady as public art.
Some might find this pragmatic agreement satisfactory. However, I think 
that there is a second, and more radical, response to Carroll’s possible objection. 
This second response questions the possibility of fully vindicating the distinction 
between meaning and significance in public art. As we have seen, such a distinc­
tion presupposes that only the context of creation determines the real properties 
of an artwork. The context of reception, on its part, plays only a secondary role: 
it merely broadens the possible associations between that artwork and a given 
cultural milieu that differs from the original one, while not affecting that art- 
work’s identity. This point, I believe, disregards the nature of our appreciation of 
an artwork as public art and, therefore, should be rejected. In effect, public art is 
essentially relational: public art, many agree, is art received within the public 
sphere. It seems to me that confining the context of reception to a secondary role 
is to neglect this essential feature of public art. In other words, considering the 
relational properties that emerge as a function of a public artwork’s reception as 
extrinsic to that artwork’s nature is to treat it, I believe, as non-public art.
Let me put this point in a slightly different way. According to Hirsch, the ob­
ject of “historical scholarship” is meaning (Hirsch, 1984: 203). That is, the aim of 
scholars involved in literary or, one might plausibly add, artistic interpretation is 
to reconstruct the intentions of the author. As such, an accurate interpretation of 
a literary text or, more in general, an artwork requires historical knowledge 
about the creation of those cultural artifacts. Plausibly, this understanding of 
historical interpretation captures what scholars interested in forms of non-public 
art do. For instance, as object generally separated from other domains of human 
life, artworks in museums function primarily as historical testimonies of the 
creativity of some extraordinary individuals from the past. An accurate interpre­
tation of that type of artworks, one might say, has to do with a rigorous recon- 
struction of the historical conditions of their respective origin, with particular 
reference to the author’s intentions.
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However, Hirsch’s view does not apply to scholarly interpretation of public 
artworks. In effect, public artworks are not separated from other domains of 
human life. As I have already suggested, public art intersects with social, politi­
cal, and economic aspects of our communities. It is a part of our social world: in 
Danto’s words, “it is us, in the medium of artistic transformation” (Danto, 1998: 
151). Thus, the relationships between a public artwork, the cultural milieu of its 
reception, and its public do not exceed the proper understanding of that artwork: 
those relationships are an essential feature of its nature as public art. In this 
sense, no accurate scholarly interpretation of a public artwork can ignore the 
history of its reception. As a living aspect of ongoing public life, there is no prin- 
cipled disjunction between the authorial meaning and the relational significance 
that a public artwork can acquire over time: those relations are an intrinsic as­
pect of its nature as public art.25 For instance, an interpretation of the Vietnam  
Veterans M em orial in Washington DC ignoring the controversies that sur- 
rounded its installation, which eventually led to the addition of Frederick Hart’s 
The Three Soldiers to Maya Lin’s wall, is not an interpretation of it as public art.26 
Similarly, an interpretation of Rock Steady as public art cannot ignore the con- 
troversy surrounding Somerville’s death. For this reason, it seems that the dis- 
tinction between meaning and significance that Hirsch originally developed and 
many intentionalists accept does not apply. To talk about how an artwork relates 
to its cultural milieu is necessary in order to interpret it as public art.27
Before concluding, I want to add a qualification. The above discussion 
merely suggests that there is no supreme authority in public art, not even artists 
themselves -  or their intentions. Of course, the claim that the artists’ intentions 
have no supreme authority in determining the properties of a public artwork 
should not be taken as implying that they have no role whatsoever in those mat- 
ters. Simply the artist’s intentions are not overriding reasons for deciding 
whether a property belongs to public artwork, and, a fortiori, cannot constrain 
their interpretations. An accurate interpretation of a public artwork generally 
exceeds the boundaries set by intentional readings.
25 Glenn Parsons and Allen Calrson raise a similar point when arguing that the nature and function 
of a plaza may very well change over time in ways that contradict the designer’s intention. See Parsons, 
Carlson, 2008: 64.
26 For a sympathetic discussion of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, see Blair, Jeppeson, Pucci Jr, 
1991: 263-288.
27 Of course, not all opinions about an artwork influence its nature as public art. However, publicly 
acceptable interpretations generally do it.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed some aspects of public artworks. I have character- 
ized public artworks as those artworks received within a public sphere, rather 
then within artworld institutions. I have added that there is a multiplicity of pub­
lic spheres within which public artworks can be received, and a plurality of pub­
lics that those artworks can address. I have suggested that, contrary to what hap- 
pens in the case of a non-public artwork, the features of a public artwork’s 
context of reception is determined significantly by considerations of the history 
of its public(s). I have then emphasized that notable events in the history of 
a public artwork’s public can change that artwork’s context of reception. As 
a consequence of those changes, an artwork may very well acquire some perlocu­
tionary properties that the artist did not intend it to have. In this sense, I have 
concluded that IT and MT do not apply when considering public artworks. 
Though I believe that one should not treat the artist’s intentions as irrelevant in 
public art matters, a public artwork’s identity or its interpretation(s) need not be 
explained in terms of those intentions.28
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